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COMMENTARY ON THE RULES OF CONVERSION 
OF TRUST FUNDS
It is of interest to study the effect of non-conversion of trust funds 
from unauthorized securities to authorized securities and the rules of 
trusts which apply to these circumstances.
On studying In  Re Beach (1) we find that it was a simple applica­
tion of the so called rule in Howe-v-Earl of Dartmouth (2). The rule 
simply stated is that
“the tenants for life are not entitled to the whole income com­
ing in from unauthorized investm ents and that the same ought to be 
valued as at the date of the testators death, and interest on the amount 
of the valuation so ascertained . . .  a t some rate be paid the ten­
ants for life.”
The case concerned the application of the principle and the deter­
m ining of the rate at which the tenant for life would be allowed the 
interest. The effect was that the Court would take into consideration  
the then prevailing financial position of the country and allow the proper 
rate upon the then existing conditions.
However the seemingly plain rule is actually much more involved 
than appears from that judgement and it bears investigation.
The case of In P e Wareham i3> held that the rule of Howe-v-Earl 
of Dartmouth m ust be applied unless it appears upon the particular 
construction of the particular will that the testator had shewn an 
intention the rule should not apply.
However on looking at the case of Howe-v-Lord Dartmouth (2) 
we find that the rule as laid down there has been greatly extended 
and possibly misquoted. The headnote of that case reads as follows:
“General rule, that, where personal property is bequeathed for 
life with remainders over, and not specifically, it is to be converted 
in the 3 per cents, subject in the case of a real security to an inquiry, 
whether it will be for the benefit of all parties; and the tenant for Jife 
is only entitled upon that principle.”
It is very hard to find the ratio decided out of the judgement of 
Lord Eldon and the whole principle seems to be based upon the small 
line in the judgement
. . . and the advantage, if any, ought not to accrue to 
the tenant for life.”
Prom this single clause the courts have developed a great and far- 
reaching rule which must be carefully analyzed to find its true meaning.
Howe-v-Earl of Dartmouth was a case concerning a WILL and 
annuities which could not be called proper investments. The case 
seemed to be based upon the principle that where there is a WASTING 
ASSET, the court will hold that conversion must be deemed to have 
taken place at the proper time and accordingly the tenant for ?ife 
would only be allowed the rate of interest that would be allowed on 
proper investments. There was considerable doubt in the mind of Lord 
Eldon as to w hat would be the result where there was a SAFE security 
but he took the stand that all securities must be taken to have been 
converted. This did not apply to real estate.
(1 )— 1920 1 ch 40
(2 )—7 Ves 137a
(3 )— 1912 2 Ch 321
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It would seem that the subsequent courts have taken the rule and 
tried to extend it far beyond its rightful use.
Happily the case of Slade-v-Chaine '4' clarifies the point to a large 
degree. Cozens-Hardy in his judgement makes the assumption that the 
rule of Howe-v-Lord Dartmouth applies only to funds left under a will 
and not to trust funds established under a deed.
The case explains the rule by saying “Howe-v-Lord Dartmouth rests 
on the principel that where a testator leaves property which is WEAR­
ING OUT, . . . that property must be realized, and that the ten ­
ant for life can only have interest on the amount thus realized.”
At the time when the case was decided every investment which 
was not in Consols was considered as an investment which was wearing 
out. Today there has been a radical change in financial matters and 
this idea has no foundation on present conditions.
Th» case was based to a large degree upon that of Stroud-v-Gwyer 
< 5 >. This c ase held that where there had been an unauthorized invest­
ment. the trustees hava discharged their liability in favour of the 
cestui quc trust who are entitled to the capital in remainder when 
they have made good the capital and any increase that capital has 
received. It went on further that no case had held that the increased 
profit made by the unauthorized investment was to be divided partly 
between the capital and partly between the income, and the excess to 
be turned into capital for the benefit of the person entitled in remainder.
Romilly M. R. went on to say that the rule of Howe-v-Lord Dart­
mouth applied where property was found in a particular state of invest­
ment at the death of the testator. This was supported by the Court 
of Appeal in the Slade case.
Thus the conclusion seems to be that where there are INVEST­
MENTS AT THE D3ATH of the testator, and a trust is created by will, 
the tenant for life is only entitled to the proper rate of interest as 
determined on the sum which would have been realized if the invest­
ments had been converted into proper investments. Any extra goes to 
the remainderman.
This rule does not apply in the case of a trust created by deed 
or settlement.
If at any time there is a subsequent UNAUTHORIZED INVEST­
MENT. the tenant for life is entitled to the FULL INTEREST on such 
investment PROVIDED that the capital or corpus IS NOT DIM IN­
ISHED.
Thus it apoears ¡hat the RULE so glibly stated is actually not as 
all embracing as it first appears, and is much more qualified and re­
stricted than one might think on first consideririg it.
(4» — 1908 1 Ch 522 
( 5 i—28 Beav 130.
GROSS neelipeoce is simolv negligence with the addition of a vitu­
perative epithet . . . .  Rolfe. B. 1843 11 M & W 113.
“There shall be no felony if a lunatic kill a man. or the like, 
because felony must be done animus felonieo. Yet in trespass, which 
tends only to give damages according to hurt or loss, it is not so, and. 
therefore, if a lunatic hurt a man he shall be answerable in trespass ” 
—Weaver v Ward 1616 Hob 134.
